While academics such as Martha Rose have contested the existence of a conceptual category of “the disabled” within the ancient Greek mindset similar to our modern definitions (Rose 2003: 95-100), Lysias 24 offers evidence, corroborated by other references, that Athenians indeed held some awareness of “disabled” men as a safeguarded category of citizens (Dillon 1995; Penrose 2015; Dillon 2016). Two times in the oration (Chs. 4 and 13), Lysias has the accused mention the accuser’s claim that he is not one “of the disabled” (τῶν ἀδυνάτων). It is quite likely that the defendant is paraphrasing or quoting the (now lost) speech of the accuser, and the use of the substantive adjective implies that this term refers to a recognized class or category of citizens.
Who precisely were these οἱ ἀδυνάτοι and what criteria determined their classification? How does this category of “disabled” (assuming its existence) correspond with and differ from our contemporary classifications? The defendant in Lysias 24 asserts that his accuser claims he is not one “of the disabled” because he receives income from a workshop and rides a horse. Collectively, these two allegations imply that for an (male) citizen to be classified as an οἱ ἀδυνάτοι and thus be eligible for state support, he must live with a physical impairment that hinders his ability to earn an income. The Athenian Constitution (Ath. Pol.), a document attributed to Aristotle or one of his students outlining the history of the Athenian political framework and detailing significant institutions, lends credence to this interpretation. The practice of public examinations (dokimasia), previously mentioned, forms one of the political institutions reviewed by the author of the Athenian Constitution. This dialogue addresses the public evaluation of citizens for who qualifies for state assistance (Ath. Pol. 49.4 and discussion at Rhodes 1981: 570-71):
The Council evaluates the disabled (τοὺς ἀδυνάτους); for there exists a law which mandates that individuals with less than three minai [of property] and who are physically impaired (τὸ σῶμα πεπηρωμένους) to such an extent that they are unable to work, undergo an assessment before the Council, and that the Council grants them two obols daily, at public cost, for their support.
Similar to Lysias many years prior, the author of the Athenian Constitution employs ἀδύνατος to describe a community of citizens whose physical disabilities bar them from earning a livelihood, thereby resulting in poverty. Rose (2003: 96) misinterprets Aristotle’s Greek (Dean-Jones 2005: 532) when she asserts that the law broadly categorized οἱ ἀδυνάτοι as any male citizen unable to sustain himself, regardless of physical disability.
From this evidence, it is reasonable to conclude that Athenian society possessed an understanding of “the disabled” as a protected segment of its citizenry. Concurrently, it is clear that this categorization or identification of “disability” diverges significantly from our modern perceptions in crucial aspects. For in Athenian law (and Athens seems to be the sole Greek city to legislate concerning physical disabilities), a physical disability alone would not render a citizen eligible for state assistance or, ostensibly, classify them as οἱ ἀδυνάτοι.
If that were the case, our defendant would only need to demonstrate his physical impairment to the Council to prevail against his accuser and obtain state support. Indeed, our defendant does refer to visible aspects of his physical disability, particularly his reliance on two canes (24.12 and 24.14), while also acknowledging that his physical appearance alone is insufficient. Thus, disability is not always overtly apparent in ancient culture (Rose 2016). To put it differently, disability in Athenian law is not exclusively a medicalized condition, defined or delineated by the absence of physical (or mental) capability; instead, disability is characterized by a physical impairment that has severely curtailed one’s social functionality.
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